Abstract: This article reveals the processes of financialisation in the South African economy by tracing the sources and destinations of NFCs' liquidity. The paper argues that rather than the volume of NFCs' financial investment, the composition of financial assets is crucial to assess corporate financialisation in the country. Non-financial businesses in South Africa fundamentally transformed their investment behaviour during the 1990s, shifting from more productive uses such as trade credit towards highly liquid and potentially innovative (and therefore risky) financial investment. Following the direction of financial flows the article shows that -fuelled by foreign capital inflows -companies' financial operations contributed to the price inflation in South African property markets.
Introduction
Financialisation has been identified as problematic in rich and increasingly also emerging economies (Demir, 2007; Becker et al., 2010; Powell, 2013; Karwowski, 2017; Tori & Onaran, 2017) . The phenomenon has been linked to subdued investment rates, speculation and heightened financial instability, as well as rising inequality. However, the processes by which financialisation brings about these socio-economic malaises often remain in the dark. When the concept is used as a catch-all for the failings of contemporary capitalism it becomes analytically vacuous (Christophers, 2015) . Therefore, it is vital to reveal the processes driving financialisation phenomena. To further this research agenda, the article identifies the link between financialisation of non-financial companies (NFCs) and residential house price inflation in South Africa. It argues that the heightened liquidity preference of South African NFCs has contributed to the rapid growth of house prices in the country by facilitating commercial banks' credit extension. The original contribution of the paper is to reveal the mechanisms by which the financialisation of NFCs contributes to financial fragility in the country more broadly. It is not the size of NFCs' financial investment that accounts for corporate financialisation in South Africa, since this type of investment has historically always been high. Rather financialisation has induced South African corporations to alter the way they invest into financial assets as well as the composition of their asset portfolios since the 1990s. The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section sketches the scope of the financialisation debate in South Africa. Two aspects of the phenomenon are particularly highlighted: the large and politically increasingly contentious cash holdings of NFCs, and the inflation of house prices. To illustrate the close link between these two socio-economic problems I proceed to introduce a detailed flow of funds analysis, followed by an analysis of the loan books held by the big four South African banks. The final section concludes by discussing the distinct nature of financialisation in emerging economies.
Financialisation in South Africa
Financialisation research developed in the context of the US (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Krippner, 2005) and until today mainly focuses on rich countries (Lapavitsas & Powell, 2013; Brown, Passarella, and Spencer, 2015; Karwowski et al., 2016) . There is an emerging body of literature on financialisation in the Global South (Becker et al., 2010; see Bonizzi, 2013, for a survey); but there are few empirical accounts, shedding light onto the processes behind financialisation (Pike & Pollard, 2010) , especially with regard to developing regions. However, detrimental financialisation dynamics are likely to harm poorer societies more than rich ones.
This dearth of in-depth empirical analysis constitutes an important gap in the literature.
South Africa is an ideal case study to address this analytical gap since the country appears to 'exemplify' the financialised emerging economy in many respects. A sectoral accountcovering the five main macroeconomic aggregates, i.e. NFCs, the financial sector, households, government, and the foreign sector -can help to systematise the concept of financialisation:
(1) In South Africa the activity of the large company groups -including first and foremost Anglo American -has been seen as major driver of financialisation. These company groups obtained an ever-increasing dominance over the South African economy the more the country fell into isolation because of the international shunning of the apartheid regime and especially since the late 1970s (Roussow et al., 2002; Chabane et al., 2006) . With the reintegration of South Africa's economy into the global financial system since 1994, these company groups, and South African corporations in general, have increasingly become involved in financial investment at the expense of real sector investment (Ashman et al., 2011) . Since corporate capital expenditure has slowed down, financial investment accounts for a rising share of the capital stock . There is evidence that the composition of NFCs' financial assets has been transformed towards more short-term instruments (Ashman & Newman, 2012) . The suspicion is that much of this financial investment has been speculative.
Thus, according to Ashman and Fine (2013, p. 156) financialisation is characterised by the expansion of financial assets relative to real activity and, crucially, 'the absolute and relative expansion of speculative as opposed to or at the expense of real investment'. Using firm-level data, Tori & Onaran (2017) provide econometric evidence that financial incomes have a negative effect on investment among large South African NFCs.
(2) The financial sector is perceived to be at the core of South Africa's ailing economy.
Since the end of apartheid the sector's share in South African gross domestic product (GDP) has grown rapidly, trebling between 1994 and the 2007-8 financial crisis (Marais, 2011) . As a consequence, finance 2 generates more than one fifth of South African output today (SARB, 2017) , which makes it the single largest contributor to GDP. Some authors (Lapavitsas, 2009 (Lapavitsas, , 2013 argue that financialisation is accompanies by a shift from bank-based to market-based financial structures. This means that banks lose importance as credit providers for NFCs, which increasingly turn towards capital markets as source of external finance. In the case of South Africa there seems to be little evidence that these dynamics are under way (Teles, 2012; Karwowski, 2016) .
(3) Since the financial crisis household financialisation has attracted more attention from academic researchers (Langley, 2008) , remaining a more recent aspect of the research agenda (see Karwowski et al., 2016 for a discussion of the concept's origins). This is especially true in emerging and developing regions. Rising household debt burdens are a symptom of financialisation (see Karacimen, 2014 , for Turkey) if growth becomes credit fuelled in the face 2 The data refers to the categories provided by the South African Reserve Bank. Here finance is subsumed under the heading: 'Finance and insurance, real estate and business services'. Business services include services that are used by the private sector, most prominently private security and cleaning services.
of stagnant wage increases and a shrinking total wage bill. The volume of household debt in South Africa is nowhere near US and UK levels but nevertheless high in comparison to other emerging economies (Karwowski & Stockhammer, 2016 in aggregate became net lenders rather than savers, running down their stocks of saving . Most of the loans taken out by South African households are mortgages, ballooning since the mid-1990s because of the enormous price inflation in residential housing (GriffithJones & Karwowski, 2015) . However, unsecured consumer loans have also been strongly on the rise, raising questions about their sustainability (Bond, 2013) .
(4) The socio-economic impact of financialisation of state institutions and policies is a nascent research area, which needs more attention (Aalbers, 2016) . In the context of South Africa, Isaacs (2014) argues that domestic macroeconomic policies have been shaped by and have importantly contributed to financialisation in the country. Particularly problematic are inflation targeting and fiscal restraint. Their combined effect is subdued domestic investment because public-sector capital expenditure is cut while private-sector companies willing to invest face prohibitively high interest rates. But high interest rates are necessary to attract short-term foreign capital to balance the country's persistent trade deficit (Isaacs, 2014) . South Africa shares this plight with other emerging economies that shy away from introducing capital account controls for short-term foreign inflows (McKenzie & Pons-Vignon, 2012) . Illegal capital flight, arising from transfer pricing and other illicit practices among transnational NFCs, exacerbates the trade deficit, increasing the country's dependence on foreign capital (Ashman et al., 2011b ).
(5) There is a strong international dimension to financialisation, most visible in crossborder capital flows (Stockhammer, 2013) . In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, poor countries became increasingly integrated into global financial structures, opening up their capital accounts to foreign financial inflows (Abiad et al., 2008) . Efforts by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote the Washington Consensus, a policy mix of fiscal restraint, deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation of trade and finance (Williamson, 1990) , were instrumental in this development. Therefore, some authors argue that financialisation in developing and emerging regions is mainly driven externally through financial liberalisation (Lapavitsas, 2009) . Financial flows from rich to poor countries increased markedly during the 1990s, surging in the 2000s (Schmuckler, 2004; Aizenman, Jinjarak & Park 2011; Nier, Sedik & Mondino 2014) . It has been argued that intensifying financialisation dynamics in rich countries drove the financial flows into poor countries during the boom years of the early 2000s (Tyson & McKinley, 2014 (Akyüz, 2015) .
As South Africa re-integrated into the global economy the country went from being a net lender to becoming a net borrower from the rest of the world (Newman, 2015) . Thus, capital inflows into South Africa increased in line with the general trend observed for emerging economies. These inflows were largely short-term and therefore volatile. Thus, they arguably drove financialisation in South Africa (Newman, 2015) . However, most financialisation researchers agree that external financialisation pressures (e.g. financial inflows or suggested macroeconomic reforms) are mediated by domestic dynamics, resulting in country-specific permutations of financialisation (Becker et al., 2010; see Rethel, 2010 for Malaysia's example).
Thus, I am not arguing that the South African experience exemplifies a standard financialisation story in the Global South since in fact that standard story does not exist. However, in comparison to other emerging economies South Africa has been affected relatively strongly by financialisation across the different macroeconomic sectors (Karwowski & Stockhammer, 2017) .
More importantly maybe, like many countries in the Global South the economy is strongly dependent on resource extraction. Hence, the South African case provides important policy lessons for other commodity exporters.
To shed light onto these lessons the article traces the way in which financialisation dynamics introduced through capital inflows play out domestically. The discussion presented here is highly topical since it links NFCs' cash and liquidity holdings, i.e. the current investment strike controversy, to the built-up of financial fragility through inflation pressures in the housing market. Housing bubbles and the realisation that homes and homeowners are financially exploitable are a major aspect of financialisation (Aalbers, 2008) . Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, South Africa experienced some of the strongest inflationary pressures in global housing markets. The country's house price inflation was comparable to that seen in Ireland, where real prices for residential property almost tripled in that period (André, 2010) . During South Africa's strong growth (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , real price gains were well above price increases in the UK and the US -two economies known for their buoyant housing markets (see figure 1 ). Financialisation is also at the root of another major socio-economic ill, currently stirring up anger in South Africa: the investment strike. With the end of apartheid a restructuring of domestic conglomerates began. Together with financial deregulation and liberalisation this was promised to deliver growth and employment. Instead, companies in SA have held large sums of cash and liquid assets (Karwowski, 2015) , choosing not to invest. As a consequence, domestic
NFCs have been accused of non-patriotic behaviour (Mbindwane, 2015 , COSATU, 2017 . As of February 2017, South African NFCs were holding cash deposits worth R719 billion (Donnelley, 2017) . This amounts to almost a fifth (17%) of the country's GDP. Crucially, this figure only accounts for the short-term cash deposits of NFCs. The true extent of the investment strike is still larger since corporations don't merely hold on to short-term deposits if they want to remain liquid. For one, they can also entrust domestics banks with time deposits, i.e. receiving higher interest rates while pledging to keep the funds with the bank for a specified and longer time period. The total amount of corporate deposits is therefore far larger, namely R1.8 trillion in 2016 (see figure 2 ). But corporations have many more options for liquidity management and financial investment beyond bank deposits. For instance, it is more lucrative to invest into financial assets such as safe but low-yielding government bonds or more innovative -read more risky -and high-yielding instruments such as for example foreign exchange and derivatives.
These instruments can arguably be a source of income beyond (and instead of) those companies'
productive operations and in a highly inflationary environment like South Africa a way to avoid losses when holding on to liquid assets.
It has been argued that the volume of NFCs' cash holdings is not excessive in historical perspective (Nyamgero, 2015) . However, it is not only the size of cash holdings that is relevantabstracting from the fact that NFCs' liquidity exceeds cash deposits with banks -but also how they circulate through the South African economy. I will show that corporate deposits facilitate mortgage extension and credit to real estate companies further fuelling the housing bubble. Thus, this paper reveals the link between the financialisation of NFCs' operations and house price inflation. In fact, the 'investment strike' is a result of NFCs' changing, i.e. financialised, behaviour. It is destabilising in two ways: First, it leads to subdued corporate investment, exacerbating domestic unemployment. Second, it contributes towards the build-up of financial fragility in the economy more broadly because it fuels house price inflation. Source: SARB, 1996a -2017a , SARB, 1996b -2017b 
Flow of funds analysis for South African NFCs
To understand how money flows circulate in an economy the flow of funds are the best starting point. In fact, they are more suitable when assessing the effect of financialisation on the economy than GDP or value added measures that are typically used, for instance, to show the size and growth of the financial sector (see Philippon, 2007) . Since flow of funds data can provide profound insights into the interaction between real and financial transactions in an economy its analysis has been adopted by some financialisation scholars (for South Africa, see Newman, 2015) .
Flow of funds data exposes the ties between real and financial transactions, treating macroeconomic aggregates as balance sheets that consist of interlinked assets and liabilities. This link becomes visible because individual sectors, NFCs in aggregate for example, are hardly ever able to balance their saving and investment activity for a given period. According to the economics textbook, NFCs run deficits on their financial balances, investing more than they collectively save. This means that they run up liabilities by borrowing, for instance, from banks.
NFCs' liabilities, i.e. loans, are then banks' assets. Overall, gross sources and uses of funds for each macroeconomic aggregate, say NFCs, have to match up. If internal funds are insufficient to back companies' planned new capital formation and desired liquidity levels (held in cash, equities, bonds etc.), NFCs will have to take up bank loans, issue bonds and equity or obtain trade credit from another sector to satisfy their funding needs (see figure 3 ). If they are unable to meet these needs through sources other than retained earnings companies will be forced to reduce their physical and/or financial investments.
Once these transactions are considered in historical time, flows (e.g. NFC borrowing) turn into stocks (e.g. NFC debt). Selling off stocks of financial investment amassed in the past can boost internal funds while large debt burdens can drain these funds, requiring interest payments and ultimately principle repayment.
Economic arguments about firms' sources of funds traditionally focused on net positions (Corbett & Jenkinson, 1996 , 1997 Innes, 1984) . This is reflected in the sectoral balances of private enterprises and the foreign sector (see figure 4) . much investment as they chose to undertake. This, of course, was a symptom of the social and economic crisis under the apartheid regime, which coincided with the country's debt crisis (Padayachee, 1991) . Non-financial businesses abstained from investing, while also facing capital controls, which hampered outright capital flight. Amongst the external sources of funds, issuance of corporate paper (i.e. bonds and equities), followed by bank lending, have historically been the most prominent (see table 1 ).
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Bond and equity issuance has been especially strong in the 1980s and 1990s. Importantly, NFCs mostly use equities rather than bonds when turning towards capital markets for funds. This tendency is so distinct that resources generated through issued bonds never exceeded more than 20% of total investment expenditure since the 1970s, while new equity rose up to 120% of total investment spending, going well beyond financing needs for productive investment. Thus, on average, equity amounted to 40% of capital investment for the entire period while bonds only made up 2% of investment. Considering the current investment strike, it is notable that large volumes of financial investment by NFCs are not a recent development, but a historical trend. This explains why some authors argue that current levels of cash holdings are not unusually high (Nyamgero, 2015 (Prinsloo, 2002) .
Because of the systematic discrimination of non-whites, particularly many black businesses remained informal and non-licenced. This benefitted formal (mostly white) businesses, which often subcontracted light manufacturing such as the production of clothing, furniture and metal goods to informal manufacturers, who were able to operate without adhering to minimum wage and work place regulations. One example documented in a survey on smallscale industry in Katlehong (situated east of Johannesburg) during the mid-1980s is that of a small packaging firm, supplying the US-based multinational firm 3M. informal and formal businesses (Rogerson, 1987) . The interlocking of informal, often Africanowned, small firms and established formal -sector, typically white-owned, NFCs seems especially strong in the brewing and distilling industries during that period. South African Breweries used shabeens, informal bars mostly run by black South Africans, as distributional channels for their alcohol. Informal distributional links were important and lucrative, since 40% of liquor sales in South Africa were deemed to happen through informal vendors during the 1980s (Rogerson, 1987) . Similarly, formal-sector retailers and wholesalers enlisted informal hawkers to sell their produce (especially clothing and newspapers) (Rogerson, 1989) .
Thus, much of NFCs financial funds supported informal businesses and their productive activity as well as household consumption as trade credit. Over the course of the 1990s the role of trade credit diminished markedly with NFCs shifting towards highly liquid financial investment. Financial assets have since to a large extent been held in cash, short-and mediumterm bank deposits, while other financial instrument 6 also became a net outlet for NFCs' funds.
Total other financial assets were negligible in the 1970s. Subsequently, they grew somewhat during the 1980s and early 1990s. But they only started to make up a substantial figure, measured as share of total gross capital formation of non-financial firms, by the late 1990s, when total other financial investment amounted to more than a quarter of non-financial firms' productive investment. According to the SARB the position 'other' captures financially innovative, and therefore most likely highly liquid, operations (Monyela, 2012) . This trend only halted during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and is likely to re-emerge. In 2014 and 2015, a sum equal to a quarter of NFCs' total investment spending, was channelled into cash and bank deposits, implying that these extremely liquid assets remain on the rise again.
Why would NFCs favour liquid financial assets since the 1990s? In an emerging market, foreign financial inflows play a crucial role because they can make the issuance of equity attractive for listed NFCs in a rising market. As discussed, in South Africa the main buyers of NFCs' equity are foreign investors. The possibility that dynamics in domestic capital markets reverse unexpectedly, i.e. foreign capital outflows, make it necessary for these companies to hold on to large volumes of liquidity. Liquidity provides them with the flexibility to shrink their balance sheet -through debt pay-offs and share buybacks at any given time -and to acquire other companies and subsidiaries. 6).
Eight main categories of financial assets can be identified: (1) Cash and deposits, (2) interest in retirement and life funds, (3) other financial assets, (4) trade credit and other shortterm loans given by non-financial firms, (5) government securities, (6) long-term loans and mortgage loans, (7) amounts receivable and (8) bond and equity purchases. Cash and cash equivalents and long-term deposits have been grouped together, since these assets are all held with South African banks -that is, commercial banks, mutual banks, the Land Bank, and the Postbank. These assets tend to be very liquid, as they are either held in current accounts or in short-term and medium-term deposits with banks. Even long-term deposits, which have a maturity span of a year and more, can typically be resolved before the end of their maturity period, albeit for a fee. The absolute levels of NFCs' liquid holdings remain vast. As shown in section II, total corporate deposits with banks were worth R1.8 trillion in 2016. These large cash holdings by NFCs have come under scrutiny with the investment strike debate. They might be on the fall in relative terms. Equally, they might not be at their historical peak. And, more generally, financial investment among South African corporations might have been larger in the past. Nevertheless, NFCs' liquidity in South Africa is substantial and, more importantly, because of a change in their financial investment behaviour during the 1990s (i.e. because of corporate financialisation) these liquid assets contribute to generating financial fragility through house price inflation as will be shown in the next section.
Financialisation and house price inflation in South Africa
NFCs' financial investment into cash and deposits ends up with South African banks, therefore we see the R1.8 trillion of NFC assets on banks' balance sheets. In the mid-1990s, half of all deposits held in South African banks still came from households (figure 2), while only around one quarter belonged to NFCs, with the balance made up by deposits from financial institutions (including banks themselves), public entities and foreign residents. According to textbook economics, households are the main savers in the economy, depositing their savings with banks which then, in their role as financial intermediaries, lend those funds out to companies (Mishkin & Eakins, 2012) .
Since 1995 corporate deposits have grown at a pace which far outstripped growth in household deposits in South Africa. As a consequence, by 1999 NFCs had taken over the position of major depositors from households, accounting for more than 50% of total deposited funds in South African banks by 2009. This share has fallen somewhat since, but nevertheless remains just above 50% of total deposits. Hence, South African banks are not only the main destination for the liquidity held by NFCs, but equally, they are also the biggest depositor group with South African banks. The switching of roles between households and NFCs is a symptom of financialisation, with NFCs becoming major creditors while households run down savings and accumulate debt. As investment spending by NFCs falters, debt-financed consumption and real estate expenditure of households become major drivers of growth in a finance-led accumulation regime (Stockhammer, 2008) .
The vast majority of NFCs' financial assets held with banks will be denominated in domestic currency, i.e. South African Rand, because foreign currency deposits account for less than 5% of total deposits held with banks in South Africa (SARB, 1995a (SARB, -2016a . The depth of local financial markets would suggest that other financial assets are also to a large extent held in Rand.
7 In a forthcoming special issue of Competition & Change (Ashman, Fine, Karwowski, This paper does not argue that deposits create credit since in most countries money is (to some extent) endogenous, i.e. can be created by commercial banks through credit extension (Jakab & Kumhof, 2015) . However, financial institutions are time-and country-specific, rather than generic, which is often implicitly assumed. As shown by Chick (1992) in her discussion of stages of banking evolution, for reserves not to be a constraint on credit creation at all, the central bank needs to accept full responsibility for financial stability. This goes hand-in-hand with a stable and low interest rate policy. Since there is no commitment of the South African
Reserve Bank (SARB) to a policy of low interest rates, interest rates have been relatively high (some would say 'ridiculously' so, Bond, 2005, p. 98) and, like in many emerging economies, driven by portfolio inflow considerations. This is especially the case since the mid-1990s when the country became the IMF's poster child of 'prudent' macroeconomic policies (Isaacs, 2014) . to support financialisation processes. Table 3 provides the shares in overall outstanding loans to the industries which are the main beneficiaries of bank credit from those four institutions. Absa, FirstRand, NedBank and Standards Bank are collectively sometimes referred to as the Big Four since they own the vast majority of banking assets in South Africa. In the early 2000s, these four owned three quarters of total banking assets in South Africa (Falkena et al., 2002) . By 2014, they accounted for more than 80% of total banking assets (The Banking Association South Africa, 2014). Thus, their loan books are representative for South African credit extension in general. Source: Annual reports by Absa, 2003 -2016 , First Rand, 2000 -2016 , Nedbank, 1998 -2016 , Standard Bank, 2002 -2016 did not manage to obtain more than a fifth of provided loans. The rest is taken up by agriculture, mining, wholesale and the electricity sector. Thus, an overwhelming share of lending is channelled towards activities which are at the core of financialisation: housing purchases, debtfinanced consumption and FIRE services. In fact, since the late 1990s lending to households (including both, mortgages and consumption credit) and the FIRE industry has captured an everincreasing share of banks' loan books (figure 9). The average share borrowed by these two sectors was a mere 16% in 1997 9 , before climbing up to three quarters of total loans in 2008 and staying at a very high level until today (in 2016 it stood at 70%). Source: Annual reports by Absa, 2003 -2016 , First Rand, 2000 -2016 , Nedbank, 1998 -2016 , Standard Bank, 2002 -2016 As house price inflation has come to a halt with the 2008 recession banks have been less favourable towards households especially in terms of mortgage extension. This accounts for the falling share of household credit in total loans. However, rather than shifting lending towards more productive sectors (such as manufacturing or the service industry), credit now increasingly 9 For 1997, figures on sectoral lending are only available from FirstRand.
benefits the FIRE industry. Thus, banks' direction of lending remains supportive of financialisation processes.
Conclusion
This article has explored the processes of financialisation in the South African economy by tracing the sources and destinations of NFCs' liquidity. Given the 'relative dearth of empirical work' on financialisation (Pike & Pollard 2010: 29) especially for regions in the Global South, this is an important contribution. The paper argues that rather than the volume of NFCs' financial investment, the composition of financial assets is crucial to assess corporate financialisation in the country. While some authors (e.g. Nyamgero, 2015) rates. In such a situation, growing NFC deposits exacerbate credit expansion. Thus, the 'investment strike' is problematic because South African NFCs are unwilling to invest, while at the same time their handling of their financial assets can induce financial fragility.
In terms of financialisation theory, this means that certain financialisation processes in emerging economies will be distinct from those in rich countries. For instance, credit extension in Anglo-Saxon markets has long been observed to be almost completely independent of banks' liabilities and rather guided by their considerations of market share and willingness to aggressively push loan creation. Therefore, NFCs' cash holdings, which have also been observed to be large in rich countries, would not influence banks' credit creation. In fact, banks in rich economies like the UK and US have strongly diversified their assets away from loans and advances (dos Santos, 2009 ). In emerging economies, by contrast, liquidity held by NFCs can encourage credit booms since it lowers banks' costs of liquidity, which is expensive when obtained from the central bank. At the same time, given the less financialised asset holdings of banks, i.e. their more traditional focus on loan issuance, corporate liquidity can induce credit extension, thus supporting the emergence of a credit bubble.
